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Abstract
Legacy device drivers implement both device resource man-
agement and isolation. This results in a large code base with
a wide high-level interface making the driver vulnerable to
security attacks. This is particularly problematic for increas-
ingly popular accelerators like GPUs that have large, complex
drivers. We solve this problem with library drivers, a new
driver architecture. A library driver implements resource man-
agement as an untrusted library in the application process
address space, and implements isolation as a kernel module
that is smaller and has a narrower lower-level interface (i.e.,
closer to hardware) than a legacy driver. We articulate a set
of device and platform hardware properties that are required
to retrofit a legacy driver into a library driver. To demonstrate
the feasibility and superiority of library drivers, we present
Glider, a library driver implementation for two GPUs of pop-
ular brands, Radeon and Intel. Glider reduces the TCB size
and attack surface by about 35% and 84% respectively for a
Radeon HD 6450 GPU and by about 38% and 90% respec-
tively for an Intel Ivy Bridge GPU. Moreover, it incurs no
performance cost. Indeed, Glider outperforms a legacy driver
for applications requiring intensive interactions with the de-
vice driver, such as applications using the OpenGL immediate
mode API.
1. Introduction
Device drivers are the main sources of bugs in operating sys-
tems [29]. They are large, fast-changing, and developed by
third parties. Since the drivers run in the kernel of modern
monolithic operating systems and are fully shared by appli-
cations, their bugs are attractive targets for exploitation by
attackers, and pose great risks to the security of the system.
This longstanding problem is particularly troubling for hard-
ware accelerators such as GPUs because they tend to have
large, complex device drivers. For example, GPU device
drivers have tens of thousands of lines of code and have seen
quite a few attacks recently [3, 8–10, 12]. This problem is in-
creasingly critical as GPUs are used even by untrusted web ap-
plications (through the WebGL framework). Indeed, browser
vendors are aware of the this security risk, disabling the We-
bGL framework in the presence of GPU drivers that they can-
not trust [14]. Obviously, this is a rough solution and provides
no guarantees even in the presence of other drivers.
Researchers have long attempted to protect the system from
device drivers. For example, user space device drivers are one
of the principles of microkernels [26]. Even for monolithic
operating systems, there exist solutions that move the driver to
user space [30], move it to a VM [42], or even sandbox it in-
situ [59,64]. Unfortunately, these solutions have yet to see any
practical success, mainly due to their inferior performance.
In this work, we revisit this problem with a fresh insight:
a large part of legacy drivers is devoted to device resource
management. Our solution, inspired by library operating sys-
tems, such as Exokernel [27] and Drawbridge [51], is a library
driver design, built on one fundamental principle: untrusted
resource management.
The library driver design incorporates this principle in two
steps. First, it separates device resource management code
from resource isolation. In a library driver design, resource
isolation is implemented in a trusted device kernel in the op-
erating system kernel, and resource management is pushed
out to the user space. Second, resource management is imple-
mented as an untrusted library, i.e., a device library. That is,
each application that intends to use the device loads and uses
its own device library. Based on some scheduling policy, the
device kernel exports the device hardware resources securely
to applications, which manage and use the resources with their
own device library.
The library driver design improves overall system security
by reducing the size and attack surface of the Trusted Com-
puting Base (TCB). With a legacy driver, the whole driver
is part of the TCB. However, with a library driver, only the
device kernel, which is smaller than a legacy driver, is part of
the TCB. Moreover, compared to a legacy driver, the device
kernel exposes a narrower lower-level interface to untrusted
software, hence reducing the attack surface of the TCB. The
security benefits of a library driver are two-fold: first, a library
driver reduces the possibility of attacks on the operating sys-
tem kernel through bugs in the driver. Second, it improves the
isolation between applications using the device, as it reduces
the amount of shared state between them. Importantly, a li-
brary driver improves the system security without hurting the
performance. Indeed, a library driver can even outperform a
legacy driver due to one fundamental reason: a library driver
avoids the overhead of syscalls and user-kernel data copies
since it is in the same address space and trust domain as the
application. The performance improvement highly depends on
the application; the more interactions there are between the ap-
plication and the driver, the more significant the performance
improvement will be.
Applying the principle of untrusted resource management
to a device driver requires certain hardware properties on
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the device and platform. We articulate these properties into
three requirements: memory isolation primitives such as an
IOMMU, innocuous device management interface, and at-
tributable interrupts. If a device and its platform meet these
properties, then it is possible to retrofit the device resource
management code in the form of an untrusted library. Every
violation of these requirements, however, forces some of the
resource management code to remain in the device kernel,
resulting in weaker security guarantees.
We target library drivers mainly for accelerators, such as
GPUs, for three reasons. First, they are an increasingly im-
portant subset of devices; we anticipate various accelerators
to emerge in the near future. Second, they are sophisticated
devices requiring large device drivers, in contrast to simpler
devices such as a mouse. Third, they often meet the hardware
requirements mentioned above, as we will discuss in §2.2.
Based on the aforementioned principle, we implement
Glider, a Linux library driver implementation for two GPUs
of popular brands, namely the Radeon HD 6450 and Intel Ivy
Bridge GPUs. We implement Glider based on the original
legacy Linux drivers. The library driver design allows us to
implement both the device kernel and the device library by
retrofitting the legacy driver code, which significantly reduces
the engineering effort compared to developing them from
scratch. We present a full implementation for the Radeon GPU
and a proof-of-concept implementation for the Intel GPU.
Our evaluation shows that Glider improves the security
of the system by reducing the size and attack surface of the
TCB by about 35% and 84% respectively for the Radeon
GPU and by about 38% and 90% respectively for the Intel
GPU. We also show that Glider provides at least competitive
performance with a legacy driver, while slightly outperforming
it for applications requiring intensive interactions with the
driver, such as GPGPU applications with a small compute
kernel and graphics applications using OpenGL’s immediate
mode.
Beyond monolithic operating systems, library drivers can
benefit other systems as well. For example, they can be inte-
grated into a library operating system, such as Exokernel [27]
or Drawbridge [51], or into sandboxing solutions such as Em-
bassies [34], Xax [25], and Bromium micro-virtualization [11],
to securely support multiplexed access to devices.
2. Library Driver: Design & Requirements
In this section, we discuss the library driver design, and elabo-
rate on hardware properties necessary to implement it.
2.1. Design
The library driver design is based on an important principle
from the library operating system research [27]: resource
management shall be implemented as untrusted libraries in
applications. Resource management refers to the code that
is needed to program and use the device. In contrast, legacy
device drivers implement resource management along with
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Figure 1: (a) Legacy driver design. (b) Library driver design.
device resource isolation in the kernel, resulting in a large
TCB with a wide high-level interface.
Figure 1 compares a library driver against a legacy driver.
The library driver design applies the aforementioned principle
in two steps. First, it separates resource management from
resource isolation. It enforces resource isolation in a trusted
device kernel in the operating system kernel and pushes re-
source management into user space. Second, the library driver
design retrofits the resource management code into an un-
trusted library, i.e., a device library, which is loaded and used
by each application that needs to use the device.
The device kernel is responsible for securely multiplex-
ing the device resources between untrusting device libraries.
Based on some scheduling policy, it binds the device resources
to a device library at the beginning of a scheduling epoch
and revokes them at the end of the epoch. If possible, the
device kernel preempts the execution upon revoke. When
hardware preemption is impossible or difficult to implement,
e.g., GPUs [46], the device kernel revokes access when al-
lowed by the device1. Many devices, including the ones in our
prototype, support only one hardware execution context. For
them, the device kernel effectively time-multiplexes the device
between device libraries. These devices are the main focus of
this paper. Some devices, however, support multiple hardware
execution contexts [5, 13, 24, 54, 63]. For those devices, the
device kernel can dedicate a hardware execution context to a
device library as will be discussed in §7.2.
The device library is responsible for managing the resources
exported to it by the device kernel. It implements all the soft-
ware abstractions and API calls needed by the application to
use the device. For example, a GPU device library implements
memory management API calls, such as create_buffer,
read_buffer, map_buffer, and move_buffer, on top of
the device memory exported to it by the device kernel. It is
important to note that the device library implements the soft-
1It is up to the scheduling policy to ensure fairness, using techniques
similar to the ones used in [33, 38, 47, 48]
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ware abstraction and APIs in user space whilst legacy device
drivers implement everything in the kernel. We also note that
today’s devices often employ user space libraries to create a
unified interface to different drivers of the same device class,
e.g., GPUs. Such user space libraries do not qualify as device
libraries since they do not implement resource management.
Key Benefits
The library driver design improves system security because
it reduces the size and attack surface of the TCB. In a library
driver, only the device kernel is part of the TCB. Moreover,
without any management responsibilities, the device kernel is
able to expose a narrower lower-level interface to untrusted
software. As a result, the library driver design improves two
aspects of system security: it raises the bar for attacks that ex-
ploit device driver bugs, and it improves the isolation between
applications by reducing the amount of shared state between
them.
The library driver design improves the system security with-
out hurting the performance. Indeed, a library driver can even
outperform legacy drivers. This is because a library driver
eliminates the overhead of the application interacting with the
driver in the kernel, including costly syscalls [57] and user-
kernel data copies. In a library driver, most of the interactions
occur inside the process in the form of function calls rather
than syscalls. Moreover, because the device library is in the
same trust domain as the application, data can be passed by
reference rather than being copied, which is commonly done
in a legacy driver.
As we will demonstrate, the library driver design allows us
to implement both the device kernel and the device library by
retrofitting the legacy driver code. This significantly reduces
the engineering effort to develop library drivers for existing
devices compared to developing them from scratch.
In addition to security and performance, a library driver
has other advantages and disadvantages. In short, the ad-
vantages include the possibility of driver customization for
applications, easier user space development and debugging,
and improved operating system memory usage accounting.
The disadvantages include difficulty of multi-process program-
ming, application launch time overhead, and coarser-grained
device memory sharing for some devices. §7.1 discusses these
issues in greater detail.
We find that library drivers are particularly useful for ac-
celerators such as GPUs, which are increasingly important
for a wide range of applications, from data centers to mobile
devices. Accelerators are sophisticated hardware components
and usually come with large, complex device drivers, particu-
larly prone to the wide variety of driver-based security exploits.
More importantly, we have found that accelerators like GPUs
often have the necessary hardware properties to implement a
library driver, elaborated next.
2.2. Hardware Requirements
Despite its benefits outlined above, library drivers cannot sup-
port all devices. The system must have three hardware prop-
erties for the device kernel to enforce resource isolation. The
lack of any of these properties will leave certain resource man-
agement code in the trusted device kernel. (i) First, in order
for each device library to securely use the memory exported to
it by the device kernel, hardware primitives must be available
to protect the part of the system and device memory allocated
for a device library from access by other device libraries. (ii)
Second, in order for a device library to safely program the de-
vice directly from user space, the registers and instruction set
used to program and use the device must not be sensitive, i.e.,
they must not affect the isolation of resources. (iii) Finally, in
order for the device kernel to properly forward the interrupts
to the device libraries without complex software logic, the
device interrupts must be easily attributable to different device
libraries. Apparently not all devices have these properties;
fortunately, accelerators of interest to us, e.g., GPUs, do have
these properties, as elaborated below.
2.2.1. Memory Isolation Primitives
The library driver design requires hardware primitives to iso-
late the access to memory by different device libraries. There
are two types of memory: system memory and device memory,
the latter being memory on the device itself. Isolation needs to
be enforced for two types of memory access: system-side ac-
cess via the CPU’s load and store instructions and device-side
access via direct device programming. Modern processors
readily provide protection for system-side access with their
memory management units (MMU). As a result, we only need
to be concerned with protecting device-side accesses.
Device-side access to system memory: The device library
can program the device to access system memory via direct
memory access (DMA). Therefore, the device kernel must
guarantee that the device only has DMA access permission
to system memory pages allocated (by the operating system
kernel) for the device library currently using the device. The
I/O memory management unit (IOMMU) readily provides this
protection by translating DMA target addresses. The device
kernel can program the IOMMU so that any DMA requests
from a device library are restricted to memory previously
allocated for it. We observe that IOMMUs are available on
most modern systems based on common architectures, such
as x86 and ARM [16, 45]. Moreover, GPUs typically have a
built-in IOMMU, which can be used by the device kernel even
if the platform did not have an IOMMU.
Device-side access to device memory: The device kernel
allocates the device memory for different device libraries, and
it must protect them against unauthorized access. A device
library can program a device to access the device memory,
and such an access does not go through the IOMMU. There-
fore, the device must provide hardware primitives to protect
memory allocated for one device library from access by an-
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other. There are different forms of memory protection that a
device can adopt, e.g., segmentation and paging. Each form
of memory protection has its pros and cons. For example,
segmentation is less flexible than paging since the allocations
of physical memory must be contiguous. On the other hand,
paging is more expensive to implement on a device [49].
Isolating access to the device memory only applies to de-
vices that come with their own memory. We note that acceler-
ators packing their own memory, such as discrete GPUs and
DSPs, often support some form of memory protection primi-
tives. For example, NVIDIA GPUs (nv50 chipsets and later)
support paging [39] and TI Keystone DSPs support segmenta-
tion [37].
A legacy driver does not require such memory protection
primitives as it can implement software-based protection. A
legacy driver implements the memory management code in
the kernel and employs runtime software checks to ensure
that untrusted applications never program the device to access
parts of the memory that have not been allocated for them.
2.2.2. Innocuous Device Management Interface
The library driver design further requires the device manage-
ment interface to be innocuous or not sensitive, as defined
by the Popek-Goldberg theorem about virtualiziblity of an
architecture [50]. According to Popek and Goldberg, sensitive
instructions are those that can affect the isolation between
virtual machines.
A device usually provides an interface for software to use it.
This interface consists of registers and potentially an instruc-
tion set to be executed by the device. The device management
interface is the part of the interface that is used for resource
management. Examples include the GPU interface used to
dispatch instructions for execution and the GPU interface used
to set up DMA transfers. Other parts of the programming in-
terface are used for initializing the device and also to enforce
isolation between resources. Examples are the GPU interface
used to load the firmware, the interface used to initialize the
display connectors on the board, the interface used to prepare
the device memory and memory protection primitives.
For registers, this requirement means that management
registers cannot be sensitive. That is, registers needed for
resource management cannot affect the resource isolation. For
example on a GPU, software dispatches instructions to the
GPU for execution by writing to a register. This register is part
of the management interface, and therefore must not affect the
isolation, e.g., change the memory partition bounds.
For the instruction set, this requirement means that either
the instruction set has no sensitive instructions, or the sensitive
instructions fail when programmed on the device by untrusted
code, such as a device library. The latter is more expensive
to implement in the device as it requires support for different
privilege levels, similar to x86 protection rings.
Commodity accelerators usually meet this requirement.
This is because registers often have simple functionalities,
hence management registers are not used for sensitive tasks.
(§4.1.3 discusses one violation of this requirement). Also,
the instruction set often does not contain sensitive instruc-
tions, and resource initialization and isolation is done through
registers only.
A legacy driver does not need the device to meet the in-
nocuous device management interface requirement. First, it
does not allow untrusted software to directly access registers.
Second, all the instructions generated by the application are
first submitted to the driver, which can then perform software
checks on them to guarantee that sensitive instructions, if any,
are not dispatched to the device.
2.2.3. Attributable Interrupts
A device library using the device must receive the device
interrupts in order to properly program and use the device. For
example, certain GPU interrupts indicate that the GPU has
finished executing a set of instructions. The interrupt is first
delivered to the device kernel, and therefore, the device kernel
must be able to redirect interrupts to the right device library
without the need for any complex software logic.
This requirement is simply met for commodity accelerators
with a single hardware execution context, since all interrupts
belong to the device library using the device. On the other
hand, we note that this requirement can be more difficult to
meet for non-accelerator devices. One example is network
interface cards with a single receive queue. Upon receiving
a packet (and hence an interrupt), the device kernel cannot
decide at a low level which device library the packet belongs to.
This will force the device kernel to employ some management
code, e.g., packet filters, to redirect the interrupts, similar to
the solutions adopted by the Exokernel [27] and U-Net [61].
A legacy driver does not have this requirement because
it incorporates all the management code that uses the inter-
rupts. Device events are then delivered to the application using
higher-level API.
3. GPU Background
Before presenting our library driver design for GPUs in §4,
we provide background on the functions of a GPU device
driver and GPU hardware as illustrated in Figure 2. A GPU
driver has three functions: hardware initialization, resource
management for applications, and resource isolation.
Initialization
GPU hardware initialization loads the firmware, sets up the
GPU’s memory controller or MMU in order to configure the
address space used by the GPU, enables the interrupts, sets
up the command processor (which is later used to dispatch
instructions to the GPU), the device power management, and
the display subsystem.
Management
Once the GPU hardware is initialized, the driver performs
resource management for applications. It implements four
important functionalities for this. First, it implements memory
management API calls. An application can request three types
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Figure 2: Simplified GPU hardware model.
of memory buffers: buffers on the device memory, buffers on
the system memory, and buffers on the system memory acces-
sible to the GPU for DMA. For the latter, the driver allocates a
range of GPU addresses for the buffer and programs the GPU’s
built-in IOMMU to translate from these addresses to their ac-
tual physical addresses on the system memory. Moreover, the
driver pins these pages so that they do not get swapped out by
the operating system kernel.
Second, the driver accepts GPU instructions from applica-
tions and dispatches them to the GPU for execution. Dispatch-
ing the instructions in done through a ring buffer. The driver
writes the instructions onto the ring buffer, and the command
processor unit on the GPU reads them and forwards them to
the processing units, i.e., shaders, in the GPU. Note that sim-
ilar to CPUs, GPUs cache memory accesses and the built-in
IOMMU has a TLB for its translations. Therefore, the driver
flushes the caches and the TLB as needed.
Third, the driver handles interrupts from the GPU. Most
importantly, it processes the interrupts that indicate the end of
the execution of the instructions by the processing units. The
driver then informs the application so that the application can
send in new instructions to be executed.
Finally, the driver implements some API calls for the appli-
cation to allocate and use a framebuffer and to set the display
mode. The framebuffer is a memory buffer holding the content
that will be displayed. Through programming the GPU or by
directly accessing the memory, the application can write to
the framebuffer. The display mode includes the resolution,
color depth, aspect ratio, etc. Different applications require to
set different modes for the display. Traditionally, the display
mode was set through the X server in Linux. However, it was
recently moved to the legacy Linux open source drivers and is
referred to as Kernel Mode Setting, or KMS. The advantage of
KMS is that it allows for better graphics at boot time (before X
is even initialized) and during Linux virtual console switching.
Isolation
The driver also enforces isolation between applications by per-
forming appropriate hardware configurations, such as setting
up the MMU page tables if supported, or through software
checks. For instance, a legacy GPU driver enforces software
memory isolation as follows. When allocating memory buffers
for an application, the driver only returns an ID of the buffer
to the application, which then uses that ID in the instructions
that it submits to the driver. The driver then replaces all the
IDs with the actual addresses of the buffers and then writes
them to the ring buffer.
Glider implements these three functionalities as follows.
Initialization is performed in the device kernel. Once the
GPU is initialized, the device kernel exports the resources to
device libraries so that they can perform resource management
in the user space. For isolation, the device kernel leverages
hardware properties introduced in §2.2. This design reduces
the size and attack surface of the TCB and hence improves the
system security. The GPU hardware often meets the required
hardware properties. It provides either a memory controller
or an MMU that can be used to enforce isolation for device-
side accesses to its memory. The management registers are
often not sensitive and the instruction set has no sensitive
instructions. Moreover, with GPUs with a single hardware
execution context, interrupts can be simply forwarded to the
device library using the GPU.
4. Glider: Library Driver for GPUs
In this section, we present Glider, library drivers for the
Radeon HD 6450 and Intel Ivy Bridge GPUs based on
retrofitting their corresponding legacy drivers. We provide
a fully-functional implementation for the Radeon GPU and a
proof-of-concept implementation for the Intel GPU.
4.1. Isolation of GPU Resources
We first identify the important GPU hardware resources and
elaborate on how the device kernel securely exports them to
device libraries.
4.1.1. Processing Units
The device kernel securely exports the GPU processing units,
i.e., shaders, by allowing access to the GPU command pro-
cessor. When binding the GPU to a device library, the device
kernel allows the device library to update the command pro-
cessor’s registers that determine the ring buffer location. This
enables the device library to allocate and use the ring buffer
that it has allocated from its own memory. The device library
then populates the ring buffer with instructions from the appli-
cation and triggers the execution by writing to another register.
At revoke time, the device kernel disallows further write to
the trigger registers. It then waits for ongoing execution to
finish on the GPU before binding the GPU to another device
library. The device kernel also takes a snapshot of the registers
updated by the device library so that it can write them back the
next time it needs to bind the GPU to the same device library.
Finally, it resets the command processor and flushes the GPU
caches appropriately.
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4.1.2. Memory
The operating system allocates system memory pages for a
device library through standard syscalls, such as mmap and the
device kernel allocates device memory for the device library
through its API calls (§4.2). When using the device, the device
kernel needs to guarantee that a device library can only access
memory allocated for it, as discussed in §2.2.1. Here, we
provide the implementation details of isolating device-side
access to memory.
For system memory, we use the system IOMMU for isola-
tion. The device kernel provides an API call for the device
library to map a page into the IOMMU. More specifically, the
device library can ask the device kernel to insert a mapping
into the IOMMU in order to translate a DMA target address
to a given physical page address. To enforce isolation, the
device kernel only maps pages that have been allocated for
the device library. The device kernel also pins the page into
memory so that it does not get swapped out or deallocated by
the operating system kernel. Upon revoke, the device kernel
stores all the mappings in the IOMMU and replaces them with
the mappings for the next device library. The mappings of an
IOMMU is in the form of page tables [16], very similar to the
page tables used by the CPU MMU. Therefore, similar to a
context switch on the CPU, changing the IOMMU mappings
can be done very efficiently by only changing the root of the
IOMMU page tables.
Alternatively, the GPU’s built-in IOMMU can be used
for isolation, which is useful for systems without a system
IOMMU. To demonstrate this, we used the built-in IOMMU
for our Intel GPU library driver. In this case, the device kernel
takes full control of the GPU’s built-in IOMMU and updates
its page tables through the same API call mentioned above.
It is up to the device library when and how much memory
it maps in the IOMMU. In our current implementation, the
device library allocates about 20 MB of memory at launch
time and maps all the pages in the IOMMU. We empirically
determined this number to be adequate for our benchmarks.
Alternatively, a device library can allocate and map the pages
in the IOMMU as needed. This alternative option speeds up
the device library’s launch process but may result in degraded
performance at runtime.
For the Radeon device memory, we use the GPU memory
controller for isolation. Isolating the device memory does not
apply to the Intel GPU since it does not have its own memory.
The memory controller on the Radeon GPU configures the
physical address space seen by the GPU. It sets the range of
physical addresses that are forwarded to the GPU memory
and those that are forwarded to the system memory (after
translation by the built-in IOMMU). By programming the
memory controller, the device kernel can effectively segment
the GPU memory, one segment per device library. Obviously,
the memory segmentation is not flexible in that each device
library can only use a single contiguous part of the GPU
memory. Changing the segments can only be done using
memory ballooning techniques used for memory management
for VMs [62], although we have not implemented this yet.
4.1.3. Framebuffer and Displays
The hardware interface for the framebuffer can be securely
exported to device libraries. The device kernel allows the
device library to have access to the registers that determine the
location of the framebuffer in memory. Therefore, the device
library can allocate and use its own framebuffer. However,
the hardware interface for display mode setting violates the
requirement in §2.2.2, forcing us to keep the display mode
setting code in the device kernel.
Every display supports a limited number of modes that it
can support. However, instead of exposing the mode option
with a simple interface, e.g., a single register, GPUs expect
the software to configure voltages, frequencies, and clocks
of different components on the GPU, e.g., display connectors
and encoders, to set a mode, and it is not clear whether such a
large hardware interface can be safely exported to unstrusted
software without risking damaging the device. Exacerbating
the problem, newer Radeon GPUs have adopted mode setting
through GPU BIOS calls. However, BIOS calls can also be
used for other sensitive GPU configurations, such as for power
management and operating thermal controllers, and we cannot
export the BIOS register interface to device libraries securely.
As a result, we keep the display mode setting code in the
device kernel. The device kernel exposes this mode setting
functionality with a higher level API call to device libraries.
This results in a larger TCB size as is reported in §5.1. Despite
its disadvantage of increasing the TCB size, keeping the mode
setting in the device kernel has the advantage that it supports
Kernel Mode Setting (§3).
4.2. The Device Kernel API
The device kernel API include seven calls for device li-
braries and two calls for the system scheduler. Except for
the set_mode call, which is GPU-specific (§4.1.3), the rest
are generic. Therefore, we expect them to be used for device
libraries of other devices as well. They constitute the minimal
set of API calls to support device library’s secure access to
system memory, device memory, and registers. The seven
calls for device libraries are as follows:
void *init_device_lib(void): This call is used when
a device library is first loaded. The device kernel prepares
some read-only memory pages containing the information that
the device library needs, such as the display setup, maps them
into the device library’s process address space, and returns the
address of the mapped pages to the device library.
iommu_map_page(vaddr, iaddr),
iommu_unmap_page(vaddr): With these two calls,
the device library asks the device kernel to map and unmap a
memory page to and from the IOMMU. vaddr is the virtual
address of the page in the process address space. The device
kernel uses this address to find the physical address of the
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page. iaddr is the address that needs to to be translated by
the IOMMU to the physical address. This will be the DMA
target address issued by the device.
alloc_device_memory(size),
release_device_memory(addr, size): With these
two calls, the device library allocates and releases the device
memory. These two calls are only implemented for GPUs
with their own memory.
int access_register(reg, value, is_write):
With this call, a device library reads and writes from and to
authorized registers. The implementation of this call in the
device kernel is simple: it just checks whether the read or
write is authorized or not, and if yes, it completes the request.
The checking is done by maintaining a list of authorized
registers. We implement read and write operations in one API
call since their implementation is different only in a few lines
of code.
Given that most registers on GPUs are memory-mapped
(i.e., MMIO registers), One might wonder why the device
kernel does not directly map these registers into the device
library’s process address space, further reducing the attack
surface on the TCB. This is because with such an approach,
protection of registers can be enforced at the granularity of a
MMIO page, which contains hundreds of registers, not all of
them are authorized for access by a device library.
set_mode(display, mode): With this call, a device li-
brary asks the device kernel to set the mode on a given display.
We next present the two calls for the system scheduler.
Schedulers for GPU resources, such as [33, 38, 47, 48], can be
implemented on top of these two API calls.
bind_device_lib(id), revoke_device_lib(id):
With these two calls, the scheduler asks the device kernel
to bind and revoke the GPU resources to and from a device
library with a given id. Since our GPUs do not support
execution preemption (§2.1), the revoke call needs to block
until the execution on the GPU terminates.
4.3. Reusing Legacy Driver Code for Glider
We reuse the Linux open source legacy driver code in Glider,
both for the device kernel and the device library, rather than
implementing them from the scratch, in order to reduce the
engineering effort. Reusing the legacy driver code for device
kernel is trivial since the device kernel runs in the kernel as
well. However, reusing it for the device library is challenging
since the device library is in the user space. We solve this
problem by using the User-Mode Linux framework [23]. UML
is originally designed to run a Linux operating system in the
user space of another Linux operating system and on top of
the Linux syscall interface. It therefore provides translations
of kernel symbols to their equivalent syscalls, enabling us to
compile the device library to run in the user space. We only
use part of the UML code base that is needed to provide the
translations for the kernel symbols used in our drivers.
Note that the UML normally links the compiled object files
into an executable. We, however, link them into a shared
library. Linking into a shared library may be challenging on
some architectures. This is because assembly code, which is
often used in the kernel, is not always position-independent, a
requirement for a shared library. We did not experience any
such problem for the x86 (32 bit) architecture. The solution to
any such potential problem in other architectures is to either
rewrite the assembly code to be position-independent or to
replace it with equivalent non-assembly code.
It is interesting to understand how system memory allo-
cation works in Glider’s device library, which is compiled
against the UML symbols. As mentioned in §4.1.2, we allo-
cate about 20 MB of system memory at the device library’s
launch. This memory is then managed by the slab allocator
of UML, similar to how physical memory is managed by the
slab allocator in the kernel. The retrofitted driver code in the
device library then allocates system memory from the UML’s
slab allocator by calling the Linux kernel memory allocation
functions, i.e., kmalloc() and its derivatives.
4.4. Other Implementation Challenges
We solved two other challenges in Glider. First, we replace
syscalls for the legacy driver with function calls into equiv-
alent entry points in the device library. Fortunately in the
case of GPU, we managed to achieve this by only changing
about 20 instances of such syscalls in Linux GPU libraries
including the libdrm, xf86-video-ati, and GalliumCom-
pute [2] libraries. An alternative solution with less engineering
effort is to use the ptrace utility to intercept and forward the
syscalls to the device library. This solution, however, will have
noticeable overhead.
Second, we implement fast interrupt delivery to device li-
braries for good performance. We experimented with three op-
tions for interrupt delivery. The first two, i.e., using the OS sig-
nals and syscall-based polling, resulted in performance degra-
dation as these primitives proved to be expensive in Linux.
The third option that we currently use is polling through shared
memory. For example, in the case of the Radeon GPU, in ad-
dition to the interrupt, the GPU updates a memory page with
the information about the interrupt that was triggered, and the
device library can poll on this page. This approach provided
fast interrupt delivery so that the interrupts do not become a
performance bottleneck. However, as we will show in §5.2.2,
it has the disadvantage of increased CPU usage.
We are considering two other options that we believe will
provide fast interrupt delivery without the extra CPU usage.
The first approach is using upcalls, which allow the kernel to
directly invoke a function in user space. The second approach
is to use the interrupt remapping hardware available from
virtualization hardware extensions. This hardware unit can
deliver the interrupts directly to the device library’s process,
similar to Dune [18].
7
5. Evaluation
We evaluate Glider and show that it improves the system secu-
rity by reducing the size and attack surface of the TCB. We also
show that Glider provides at least competitive performance
with a legacy kernel driver, while slightly outperforming it for
applications that require extensive interactions with the driver.
5.1. Security
We measure the size and attack surface of the TCB, i.e., the
whole driver in the case of a legacy driver and the device kernel
in the case of Glider. Unlike the legacy driver that supports
various GPUs of the same brand, Glider only supports one
specific GPU. Therefore, for a fair comparison, we remove
the driver code for other GPUs as best as we manually can.
This includes the code for other GPU chipsets, other display
connectors and encoders, the code for the legacy user mode
setting framework not usable on newer GPUs (§3), the code
for audio support on GPUs, and the code for kernel features
not supported in Glider, such as with Linux debugfs.
Our results, presented in Table 1, show that Glider reduces
the TCB size by about 35% and 38% for the Radeon and Intel
GPUs, respectively. In the same table, we also show the size
of the code in C source files (and not header files). These
numbers show that a large part of the code in Glider TCB
are headers, which mainly include constants, such as register
layouts. Not including the headers, Glider reduces the TCB
size by about 47% and 43% for the Radeon and Intel GPUs.
As discussed in §4.1.3, the display subsystem hardware in-
terface violates the hardware requirements for a library driver
resulting in a larger TCB. To demonstrate this, we measure
the code size in display-related files in the device kernel. For
the Radeon and Intel GPUs, we measure this number to be 19
and 13 kLoC, which is 50% and 54% of the Glider TCB.
We also show the TCB attack surface in Table 1. Glider
reduces the attack surface by 84% and 90% for the Radeon
and Intel GPUs. Glider only exposes 9 and 7 API calls for
these GPUs, as described in detail in §4.2 (Intel GPUs do
not implement the two API calls for device memory). In
contrast, the legacy driver exposes 56 and 68 API calls for the
same GPUs. These large number of API calls are used for
memory management, GPU execution, display mode setting,
and inquiring information about the GPU. Glider supports the
first two by securely giving a device library access to part
of the GPU management interface. It supports mode setting
with one API call and supports the information inquiring API
either through the constants compiled into the device library
or through the read-only information pages mapped into the
device library (§4.1).
5.2. Performance
In this section, we evaluate the performance of Glider for the
Radeon GPU using both compute and graphics benchmarks.
For the experiments, we run the drivers inside a 32-bit x86
TCB TCB API
(all files) (source files) calls
Radeon
Legacy 55 34 56
Glider 36 18 9
Reduction 35% 47% 84%
Intel
Legacy 39 30 68
Glider 24 17 7
Reduction 38% 43% 90%
Table 1: TCB size and attack surface for the legacy and Glider
for the Radeon HD 6450 and Intel Ivy Bridge GPUs. The num-
bers for both TCB columns are in kLoC. The first TCB columns
reports LoC in both source and header files. The second TCB
column excludes the header files.
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Figure 3: OpenCL matrix multiplication. The x-axis shows the
(square) matrix order. The y-axis is the time to execute the
multiplication on the GPU, normalized to the average time by
the legacy driver.
(with Physical Address Extension) Ubuntu 12.04 operating
system running Linux kernel 3.2.0. The machine has a 3rd
generation core i7-3770 (with hyper-threading disabled). We
configure the machine with 2 GBs of memory and 2 cores. In
order to minimize the effect of the operating system scheduler
on our experiments, we isolate one of the cores at boot time
using the Linux isolcpus command-line boot option. With
this option, Linux only schedules kernel threads on the iso-
lated core, but it does schedule user application threads on it
unless explicitly asked for. We then pin our benchmarks to the
isolated core and set the highest scheduling priority for them.
In order to use the system IOMMU for the Radeon GPU, we
run the benchmarks inside a Xen VM with the same configu-
rations mentioned above (2 GBs of memory and 2 cores). The
Radeon GPU is assigned to the VM using the direct device
assignment [16, 19, 32, 44].
5.2.1. Compute Benchmarks
We use a matrix multiplication benchmark running on top
of the GalliumCompute [2] framework, an open source im-
plementation of OpenCL. We evaluate the performance of
multiplying square matrices of varying orders. For each ex-
periment, we use a host program that populates input matrices
and launches the compute kernel on the GPU. The programs
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repeats this for 1000 iterations in a loop and outputs the aver-
age time for a single iteration. We discard the first iteration to
avoid the effect of Glider’s launch time overhead (character-
ized in §5.3) and we do not include the time to compile the
OpenCL kernel. We then repeat the experiment 5 times for
each matrix size and report the average and standard deviation.
Figure 3 shows the results, normalized to the average perfor-
mance by the legacy driver in each case. It shows that Glider
outperforms the legacy driver for smaller matrix sizes, while
providing competitive performance for all other sizes. This is
because for large matrix sizes, the majority of the time is spent
on transferring the data between the system and device mem-
ory and on the GPU executing the kernel. Consequently, the
driver design does not impact the performance noticeably. For
smaller sizes, on the other hand, the overhead of application’s
interaction with the driver becomes more significant.
5.2.2. Graphics Benchmarks
For graphics, we use two OpenGL benchmarks running on
top of the MESA open source implementation of OpenGL [4].
Both benchmarks draw a teapot, and update the screen as fast
as possible. One benchmark uses the Vertex Array API [7]
(the immediate mode) and the other uses the Display List
API [6]. In each experiment, we run the benchmark for 5
minutes, recording the framerate every second. We discard
the first 5 frames to avoid the effect of Glider’s launch time
overhead (characterized in §5.3). We repeat each experiment
three times.
The results, shown in Figure 4, demonstrates that Glider
achieves similar performance as the legacy driver for the Dis-
play List benchmark but outperforms the legacy driver for the
Vertex Array one. In order to explain these results, it is im-
portant to understand these two OpenGL API’s. With Vertex
Arrays, the program needs to send the vertices information to
the device for every frame, which requires interacting with the
driver quite significantly. On the other hand, the Display List
API allows this information to be cached by the device in order
to avoid resending from the application. Intuitively, Glider
improves the performance for the benchmark with more driver
interactions, or the Vertex Array.
We also measure the CPU usage for both drivers when run-
ning these benchmarks. Our results show that the legacy driver
consumes 53.7% and 41.7% of the CPU time for the Vertex
Array and Display List benchmarks, respectively, whereas
Glider consumes 75.3% and 71.6% of the CPU time for the
same benchmarks. The extra CPU usage of Glider is due to
polling the memory for interrupts (§4.4). One might wonder
whether the extra CPU usage is the source of the performance
improvement. To investigate this, we attempted to employ sim-
ilar polling methods in the legacy driver, but failed to improve
the performance. Therefore, we are convinced that Glider’s
performance improvement is due to eliminating the application
and driver interactions’ overhead. We also report the perfor-
mance when using syscall-based polling in the device library,
which incurs delay in delivering the interrupt to the device
library. With this method, for the Vertex Array and Display
List benchmarks, respectively, Glider consumes 54.3% and
35.3% of the CPU time, and achieves 193.3 and 231.5 median
frames per second, which are noticeably lower compared to
when the device library polls the memory for interrupts.
Figure 4 also shows that Glider achieves a noticeably lower
minimum framerate, although the minimum happens rarely.
To further demonstrate this, we show a sample run of the
Vertex Array benchmark in Figure 5. Our investigation shows
that the performance drop is due to OS scheduling despite our
attempts to minimize such effect.
5.3. Library Driver Overheads
We measure two important overheads of Glider: the device
library’s launch time overhead and the device kernel’s switch
time, i.e., the time it takes the core to revoke the GPU from
one device library and bind it to another.
Figure 5 illustrates the effect of the device library’s launch
time overhead on the graphics benchmark reported before. It
shows that the performance of Glider is inferior to that of the
legacy driver in the first few seconds. There are two sources
for this overhead: the device library’s initialization overhead
and the UML’s slab allocator’s initialization overhead. The
former is the time it takes the device library to initialize itself
so that it is ready to handle requests from the application. We
measure this time to have an average/standard deviation of
of 109 ms/7 ms and 66 ms/0.3 ms for the Radeon and Intel
GPUs, respectively. The latter is because the slab allocator of
UML (§4.3) takes some time to populate its own cache, very
similar to the suboptimal performance of the slab allocator in
the kernel at system boot time.
We also measure the switch time in the device kernel, as
defined above. We measure this time to have an average and
standard deviation of 42 µs and 5 µs for the Radeon GPU (we
have not yet implemented this feature for the Intel GPU). The
switch time consists of the device kernel taking a snapshot of
GPU registers updated by the current device library, writing
the register values for the new device library, changing the
IOMMU mappings, resetting the command processor, and
flushing the GPU caches and the built-in IOMMU TLB. These
measurements show that changing the GPU binding can be
done fairly quickly.
5.4. Engineering Effort
As mentioned, we build Glider by retrofitting the Linux open
source drivers as a baseline. We added about 4 kLoC and 2
kLoC for the Radeon and Intel library drivers, respectively.
These changes were applied to 49 and 30 files, and we added
two new files in each case. We have implemented both the
device kernel and the device library on the same driver, and
the two are differentiated at compile time. While we believe
that reusing the legacy driver code significantly reduced our
engineering effort compared to developing from scratch, we
note that implementing the library drivers still required notice-
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Figure 4: Graphics performance. The box plots show 90%
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Figure 5: A sample run of the Vertex Array benchmark. The
framerate is measured every second. The figure shows the
rare drops of framerate and the slow start of Glider.
able effort. The main source of difficulty was gaining a deep
understanding of the GPU internals and its device driver with
10s thousands of lines of code. Fortunately, our experience
with the Radeon GPU library driver made it easier for us to
prototype the Intel GPU library driver. We therefore believe
that experienced driver developers can develop library drivers
without prohibitive engineering effort.
6. Related Work
Library Operating Systems and Sandboxes
Library operating systems, such as Exokernel [27] and Draw-
bridge [51] improve the system security by executing the op-
erating system management components as a library in the
application’s process address space. Library drivers are com-
plementary; they can serve as a secure way for applications to
use the devices.
Hardware sandboxing techniques, such as Embassies [34],
Xax [25], and the Bromium micro-virtualization [11], improve
the system security by reducing the TCB size. Library drivers
can complement these sandboxes by providing them with
secure access to devices.
Alternative Device Driver Designs
Many previous solutions have attempted to reduce the drivers’
risk on the system security. Some solutions move the driver to
user space or to a VM. For examples, in microkernels, drivers
reside completely in user space in order to keep the kernel
minimal [26, 28, 31, 41, 55]. SUD also encapsulates a Linux
device driver in a user space process, and similar to Glider,
uses the IOMMU and UML to achieve this [21]. Microdriver
is another solution, which splits the driver between the kernel
and user space [30]. It keeps the critical path code of the
driver in the kernel, but redirects the execution to the user
space elsewhere. Hunt [35] also presents a solution that moves
the driver to the user space by employing a proxy in the kernel.
LeVasseur et al. [42], on the other hand, execute the device
driver in a VM. All these solutions improve the security of the
operating system kernel by removing the driver. However, in
contrast to a library driver, they cannot improve the isolation
between processes using the device, since the driver is fully
shared between them. Moreover, unlike a library driver, these
solutions are reported to hurt the performance.
CuriOS [22] improves the isolation between applications
that use a microkernel service, such as the file system, by
providing the service with access to client states only when
the service is processing a request. This allows for recovery
from most of the errors in the service. In contrast, library
drivers improve the isolation between application by reducing
the TCB size.
Other solutions try to protect against errors in the drivers,
either using runtime and hardware-enforced techniques such
as Nooks [59] or using language-based techniques such as
SafeDrive [64]. In contrast, a library driver improves the
system security by reducing the TCB size through the principle
of untrusted resource management.
Zhou et al. move the device driver to the user space in
order to create a trusted path between the application and the
device [65, 66]. However, they assume a single application
using an I/O device and therefore they assign the device to
the application. Unlike them, we tackle a more challenging
problem where the I/O device is shared between untrusting
applications.
Schaelicke [56] and Pratt [52, 53] propose hardware archi-
tectures to support secure user space access to devices. In this
work, we show that adequate hardware primitives already exist
on commodity accelerators, such as GPUs, platforms to run
the device management code in the user space.
Exokernel [27], U-Net [61], and sv3 [58] move part or
all of the network device driver to the user space for better
security or performance. MyCloud SEP detangles the resource
management functions for disks and make them untrusted in
order to reduce the TCB of virtualization platforms [43]. We
share the same goals with this line of work. However, in our
work, we demonstrate that such an approach is applicable to a
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wider range of devices, especially accelerators such as GPUs,
and present a framework to apply similar concepts to other
devices as well.
Some existing device drivers incorporate a user space com-
ponents in addition to the kernel driver. Such drivers differ
from library drivers in one of two ways. First, the user space
component is in the TCB since it is shared by applications us-
ing the device. By compromising this user space component,
a malicious application can attack other applications. This
component is either a process (e.g., the driver host process
in Windows User-Mode Driver Framework (UMDF) [15]) or
a library loaded by a shared process (e.g., Mali GPU drivers
for Android, where libraries are loaded by the surface_flinger
process and libusb, where the loader process can control the
device). Second, although the I/O stack includes untrusted
libraries, the kernel driver implements high-level resource
management with several APIs. For example, the in-kernel
Display Miniport Driver of Windows Display Driver Model
(WDDM) implements ~70 APIs including APIs for command
submission [1]. Mali kernel drivers for Linux exports ~40
APIs.
Some devices provide per-process hardware support. Exam-
ples are some NVIDIA GPUs and Infiniband devices, which
support per-process command queues. While such hardware
support is added for performance, it improves the system secu-
rity as well by reducing the TCB size, similar to library drivers.
Our work shows that similar goals can be achieved for devices
without such explicit hardware support as well.
Virtualization
gVirt [60] supports mediated passthrough of Intel GPUs. Priv-
ileged modules running in the Xen hypervisor and Dom0 give
VMs direct access to performance-critical resources of the
GPU while emulating their access to sensitive resources, al-
lowing VMs to use the native device driver. In contrast, library
drivers are designed to securely multiplex a device between
processes in the same operating system. However, the hard-
ware isolation techniques used in gVirt can be leveraged in
library drivers for Intel GPUs as well.
The nonkernel [20] is proposed to give applications direct
access to devices. In contrast, we demonstrated that a device
can be shared between multiple applications if its resources
are multiplexed at a finer granularity.
Dune [18] gives applications direct access to virtualization
hardware extensions. Library drivers benefit from virtualiza-
tion extensions as well. For example, the device kernel uses
the IOMMU to isolate device DMA targets. However, in con-
trast to Dune, the hardware features are used by the device
kernel running in the kernel.
Paradice [17] paravirtualizes I/O devices at the device file in-
terface and hence allows virtual machines to directly talk to the
device driver. For security, it uses a trusted hypervisor to pro-
vide fault and device data isolation between virtual machines
assuming that the device driver is compromised. However, it
cannot provide other guarantees such as functional correctness.
Library drivers are complementary as they reduce the device
driver TCB size and attack surface, reducing the possibility of
the device driver getting compromised in the first place.
Other Accelerator Architectures
Heterogeneous System Architecture [40] is a standard for fu-
ture accelerators, targeting both the accelerator hardware and
software. One hardware features of the HSA is the support for
user space dispatch, allowing applications to dispatch instruc-
tions to the accelerator without communicating with the driver
in the kernel. In our work, we demonstrated that such a fea-
ture is feasible even with commodity accelerators. Moreover,
we anticipate that other resource management tasks, such as
memory management, still remain in the trusted device drivers
for HSA-compliant devices, whereas a library driver makes
all the management code untrusted.
7. Discussions
7.1. Pros and Cons of Library Drivers
Other than improved security and performance, library drivers
have three other advantages and three disadvantages. The
advantages are as follows. First, library drivers allow each
application to customize its own device library. For exam-
ple, applications can trade-off the initial cost of allocating a
pool of memory buffers with the runtime cost of allocating
buffers as needed. Second, library drivers greatly simplify
driver development because the developer can use user space
debugging frameworks or high-level languages, none of them
are available in the kernel. Moreover, developers can use a
unified debugging framework for both the application and the
device library, which can greatly help with timing bugs and
data races. Third, library drivers improve memory usage ac-
counting by the operating system. Legacy drivers for some
devices, such as GPUs, implement their own memory man-
agement, which gives applications a side channel to allocate
parts of the system memory, invisible to the operating system
kernel for accounting. In contrast, with a library driver, all
the system memory allocated by a device library is through
the standard operating system memory management interface,
e.g., the mmap and brk syscalls in Linux.
The library driver design has the following disadvantages.
First, library drivers complicate multi-process programming.
For example, sharing memory buffers between processes is
easily done in a legacy driver, but requires peer-to-peer com-
munication between the device libraries in a library driver.
Second, library drivers incurs launch time overheads to appli-
cations. We evaluated this overhead in §5.3 and showed that
it is not significant. Third, depending on the device, a library
driver may achieve coarser-grained device memory sharing
for applications. A legacy driver can share the device memory
at the granularity of buffers, whereas with devices without
paging support for their own memory, such as the Radeon
GPU in our setup, device memory can only be shared between
device libraries using contiguous segments.
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7.2. Devices with Multiple Hardware Execution Contexts
For devices with multiple execution contexts, the device ker-
nel should bind and revoke the hardware contexts to device
libraries independently. This puts new requirements on the
device and platform hardware as we will explain next.
First, the hardware management interface for different con-
texts must be non-overlapping and isolated. That is, registers
for each context should be separate and instructions should
only affect the resources of the given context. Also, device
DMA requests must be attributable to different contexts at a
low level so that an IOMMU can be used to isolate them.
As an example, self-virtualized devices [5, 24, 54, 63] ex-
port multiple virtual devices, each of which can be separately
assigned to a VM. As a result, they readily provide all the
hardware primitives for the device kernel to bind different
virtual devices to different device libraries.
7.3. Radeon Instruction Set
We allow a device library to directly dispatch instructions
to our Radeon and Intel GPUs since the instructions are not
sensitive. We noticed a curious case with the Radeon GPU’s
instruction set though. Using the instructions, an application
can write to the registers of GPU processing units in order
to program and use them. Fortunately, it is not possible to
use the instructions to write to registers of components of the
GPU that affect the isolation, such as the memory controller.
However, we noticed that the Linux open source Radeon driver
returns error when inspecting the instructions submitted by an
applications and detecting accesses to large register numbers,
which surprisingly correspond to no actual registers according
to the AMD reference guide [36] and the register layout in
the driver itself. Therefore, we believe that this is a simple
correctness check by the driver and not a security concern.
Therefore, we currently do not employ such a check in device
kernel, although that is a possibility. Adding the check to the
device kernel will increase the TCB size by about a few kLoC,
but should not degrade the performance compared to what
was reported in this paper since we already performed these
checks in the device library in our benchmarks (although it
was not necessary).
8. Conclusions
We presented library drivers, a driver design that improves sys-
tem security by running device management code in untrusted
libraries within application processes rather than in the kernel.
We discussed the device and platform hardware properties
needed for a library driver and showed that they are mostly
available for commodity accelerators, such as GPUs, which
are of interest to us. We presented Glider, a library driver
implementation for two GPUs of popular brands, Radeon and
Intel. Our evaluation showed that Glider reduced the size and
attack surface of the TCB. Moreover, it improved the perfor-
mance for benchmarks requiring intensive interactions with
the driver. We believe that library drivers are a viable solution
for accelerators, an increasing important subset of devices.
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